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COMMENT: THE OIRA MODEL FOR 
INSTITUTIONALIZING CBA OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
RYAN BUBB* 
This comment is a brief response to the stimulating articles by Professors 
Coates1 and Cox2 in this volume. In responding, I follow an important analytic 
distinction that Coates makes that is critical for understanding the issues. One 
important issue in financial regulation is what analytic framework and decision 
procedure we want regulators to apply in setting policy. Given some resolution 
of this first issue, a second analytically distinct issue is what institutional 
framework of administrative decisionmaking will best bring about the 
application by regulators of our preferred analytic approach and decision 
procedure for financial regulation.3 
Beginning with the first issue, both Coates and Cox largely agree that policy 
decisions about financial regulation should be made using what Coates refers to 
as “conceptual cost-benefit analysis (CBA).”4 By conceptual CBA, Coates 
simply means standard economic analysis of policy, in which the analyst (1) 
specifies the problem the regulation aims to solve, (2) identifies and, when 
possible, measures the costs and benefits of a range of regulatory options, and 
(3) chooses the option that best optimizes the tradeoff between the costs and 
benefits.5 As Coates puts it, CBA “remains the best available overarching 
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 1.  John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory 
Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 [hereinafter Coates, Towards Better Cost-
Benefit Analysis] at 1. Coates’s article in this volume is a part of a larger project on cost-benefit analysis 
in financial regulation to which this comment is also responsive. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) [hereinafter 
Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation]. 
 2.  James D. Cox, Regulating Securities Markets after Business Roundtable, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 25. 
 3.  Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 2; Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 5–6. Coates uses different terminology than I use here, 
referring to the first issue of how regulatory decisions are made as “policy,” and the second issue of 
institutional design as “law.” Id. Professor Robert Bartlett provides an illuminating analysis of the 
various institutional frameworks that are currently used for CBA of financial regulation. See Robert 
Bartlett, The Institutional Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale of Four 
Paradigms?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S379 (2014). 
 4.  Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 2–5; Cox, supra note 2, at 31 
(“[A] close assessment of the costs and benefits matter a good deal in the sound formulation of 
policy.”). 
 5.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 5–6.  
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conceptual framework for organizing and communicating the pros and cons of a 
proposed regulation.”6 Amen to that. 
Many objections to CBA of financial regulation that have been offered in 
the literature are not really objections to conceptual CBA as a decision 
procedure, but rather are objections to particularly stilted forms of CBA7 or are 
objections to particular institutional mechanisms for bringing about some form 
of CBA.8 An important contribution of Coates’s work is to clarify the terms of 
this debate. Virtually everyone engaged in the debate over CBA of financial 
regulation supports conceptual CBA as an analytic framework for financial 
regulation. 
Relatedly, both Coates and Cox urge more experimentation, 
incrementalism, and retrospective review in financial regulation as ways to 
produce better information to guide regulatory policy.9 Such methodological 
innovations are undoubtedly long overdue, and not just in financial regulation 
but in many policy domains. 
Nonetheless, both articles express some skepticism about quantified CBA in 
financial regulation. Coates’s skepticism stems in part from a set of detailed 
case studies of how one might do quantified CBA in financial regulation, from 
which he concludes that “precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains 
unfeasible.”10 If quantification is exceedingly difficult, then a norm requiring 
that costs and benefits be quantified might slow down or even paralyze the 
regulatory process. It might also simply serve to camouflage the agency’s 
discretionary choices by hiding them under “impressive numbers.”11 Cox raises 
the related concern that it is often easier to quantify the costs of financial 
regulation than to quantify the benefits.12 If so, then quantified CBA might 
systematically lead to too little regulation. So their objections to quantified 
CBA might stem in part from a concern that calls for quantified CBA of 
financial regulation may be little more than thinly veiled attempts by those 
opposed to financial regulation to gum up the regulatory works.13 
 
 6.  Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 5. 
 7.  For example, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that applying CBA to financial regulation is a 
“category mistake” because the financial system is a “constructed system” whereas CBA was 
developed for “natural systems” like the environment. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-
Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S352 (2014). However, his criticism 
boils down to a concern that it is hard to quantify the benefits and costs of financial regulation, and 
hence his objection seems to be to a particular form of quantified CBA, not to conceptual CBA. See id. 
at 6 (“[S]econd order effects make the benefits and costs of rule adoption impossible to quantify in a 
meaningful way” and hence CBA “will encourage a myopic focus on what is measurable in a time 
frame in which they can be measured.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 90–91. 
 9.  Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 11–23; Cox, supra note 2, at 35–
44. 
 10.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 95. 
 11.  Id. at 92. 
 12.  Cox, supra note 2, at 29–31. 
 13.  Hence Coates refers to “interest groups seeking to delay [new financial regulations]” as among 
the supporters of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit 
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Although those concerns about quantified CBA are well taken, they are a 
bit overstated. Coates observes that he has yet to find a single example of a 
“reliable, precise, quantified” CBA of a significant financial regulation, despite 
significant efforts to identify one.14 This lack of quantitative CBA of financial 
regulation stands in stark contrast to many other regulatory domains in which 
highly sophisticated, quantitative CBA plays a central role, including 
environmental, health, safety, and antitrust regulation. Why is financial 
regulation such an outlier with relatively little CBA? Coates’s explanation is 
that CBA of financial regulation is “an order of magnitude more difficult than 
its advocates seem to believe.”15 
But relative difficulty of doing CBA in financial regulation seems an 
unlikely explanation for its paucity. CBA in financial regulation is undoubtedly 
difficult, for reasons both Coates and Cox adduce. But it is no more difficult—
indeed, it might be less difficult—than it is in many other domains in which it 
plays a central role.16 
Consider, for example, climate policy. One of the most rewarding projects I 
worked on in my time at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) prior to entering the legal academy was an interagency effort to 
quantify the social cost of carbon for use in CBA of rules affecting greenhouse-
gas emissions.17 The uncertainties and complexities entailed by the effort were 
in the extreme. To give just a taste, consider this: A substantial portion of the 
estimated present value of the benefits of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions 
today stems from resulting reductions in harm from global warming two-
hundred years from now.18 What will society look like in the year 2214? The 
uncertainties are legion. But the interagency working group forged on and 
produced a range of quantitative estimates that are now being used to inform 
policymaking.19 Is quantified CBA of financial regulation really more 
challenging than quantified CBA of climate policy? I think the answer is no. 
An alternative explanation for the varying role of CBA across regulatory 
domains leads to the second analytic issue: how best to institutionalize CBA as 
a decision procedure. A key institutional impetus for the adoption of CBA in 
 
Analysis, supra note 1, at 1. 
 14.  Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 10. 
 15.  Id. at 3; Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 88. 
 16.  Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation 11 (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 660, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346466 (arguing that quantification may in fact be easier in financial 
regulation than in other domains). 
 17.  Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical Support Document—Social 
Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis—Under Executive Order 12866 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf. 
 18.  Id. at 25. 
 19.  The social cost of carbon was estimated in order to allow agencies to incorporate the social 
benefits from reduced climate change in regulations that would have a “marginal” effect on global 
emissions. Id. at 1. For an example of its use, see Energy Conservation Standards for Refrigerated 
Bottled or Canned Beverage Vending Machines, 10 C.F.R. § 431 (Aug. 31, 2009). 
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environmental, health, and safety regulation was the imposition of centralized 
regulatory review. A series of executive orders required executive agencies both 
to conduct CBA and to submit their significant rules and accompanying analysis 
for review by OIRA prior to publishing them in the Federal Register.20 Faced 
with an external reviewer that held a quasi-veto right over their most important 
regulations, executive agencies invested in analytic capacity for generating 
sophisticated, quantitative CBA to guide policymaking.21 
In contrast, with the limited historical exception of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency,22 financial regulatory agencies are independent 
agencies outside the scope of the executive orders mandating CBA and 
centralized regulatory review.23 CBA plays little role in financial regulation not 
because it is especially challenging but rather because institutional structures do 
not produce incentives for financial regulators to develop and employ CBA. 
The historical development of CBA in other regulatory domains thus 
provides useful lessons for institutional reforms to improve CBA in financial 
regulation. Consider in particular the adoption of CBA at the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). When President Nixon created the EPA in 1970, it 
was staffed by political appointees and civil servants committed to its 
environmental protection mission and highly motivated to issue new regulations 
to protect the environment.24 But parallel to the inception of a mission-oriented 
EPA was the emergence of centralized regulatory review and the requirement 
that the agency, when not prohibited by statute, use CBA. Centralized 
regulatory review is often dated back to an executive order issued by President 
Reagan in 1981 that formalized the process,25 but the practice predates that 
executive order by a decade. The EPA and the regulatory reviewers at the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) came into conflict shortly after the 
EPA was created,26 and that conflict between the EPA and OMB (specifically 
OIRA, the subunit of OMB now tasked with regulatory review) has continued 
across presidential administrations and remains today.27 
 
 20.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 14 (2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1993); Exec. 
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
 21.  See Michael Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
609 (2014) (explaining that the imposition of OIRA review led the EPA to develop expertise in CBA of 
environmental regulation). 
 22.  Housed within an executive-branch agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was 
subject to OIRA review under Executive Order 12,866 until it was specifically exempted from OIRA 
review by the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at S381.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 95, 128 (2014). 
 25.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
 26.  See ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING 
AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 125 (1980) (describing how the OMB forced the EPA to submit its 
regulations for review beginning in 1971). 
 27.  For example, Cass Sunstein, the first Administrator of OIRA in the Obama administration, 
returned the EPA’s proposal to regulate ozone more stringently, explaining that the president had 
“instructed [him] to give careful scrutiny to all regulations that impose significant costs on the private 
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In response to both the executive-branch norm that the agency use CBA, 
and to the conflict between the EPA and bureaucrats at OIRA who passed 
judgment on the quality of its CBA and on its proposed rules, the EPA 
developed substantial analytic capacity, both in house and in a network of 
government contractors.28 And the mission orientation of the EPA staff helped 
mitigate potential ossification of the agency’s regulatory process produced by 
regulatory review. Today it is not unusual for significant rules issued by the 
EPA to be accompanied by many hundreds of pages of supporting analytic 
materials.29 The creative tension within the executive branch between the EPA 
and OIRA has produced more and better information and analysis for 
regulatory decisionmaking.30 For example, when the interagency effort to 
quantify the social cost of carbon was initiated, the working group was able to 
rely on substantial in-house expertise at EPA on the relevant economic models 
of climate change. 
This history suggests a similar approach could be successful in 
institutionalizing CBA of financial regulation. A norm requiring conceptual 
(and, when possible, quantified) CBA in financial regulation should be 
established. To provide meaningful incentives for the financial regulatory 
agencies to implement that norm, the agencies’ rules and accompanying CBA 
should be subject to review by a body external to the agencies.31 That review 
process should be given teeth by authorizing the reviewing body to reject rules 
that lack a sound policy basis or for which the costs and benefits have not been 
identified and quantified to the extent feasible. A clearer sense of mission in 
each agency should be institutionalized to combat any increased risk of 
ossification in the regulatory process. 
Which brings me to the infamous Business Roundtable decision.32 Coates 
and Cox are each vociferous critics of the decision on both legal and functional 
grounds,33 and their articles share a common theme that courts should play a 
limited role in reviewing agency CBA. 
An additional reason for skepticism about judicial review of CBA relates to 
 
sector” and “does not support finalizing the rule at this time.” Letter from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Office 
of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf. 
 28.  Livermore, supra note 21. 
 29.  For example, the regulatory impact analysis for the EPA’s recent Clean Power Plan proposed 
rule ran some 376 pages. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for 
Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, EPA, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/111dproposalRIAfinal0602.pdf. 
 30.  Bubb & Warren, supra note 24, at 127–30. 
 31.  Professor Bartlett similarly advocates for a form of intra-executive branch review of financial 
regulatory agencies’ CBA in order to improve the use of CBA in financial regulation. See Bartlett, 
supra note 3, at S399–S403. However, he envisions a weaker form of review than proposed here, 
emphasizing the desirability of an “effectively unenforceable obligation” for financial agencies to use 
CBA. Id. at S382. 
 32.  Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 33.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 28–29; Cox, supra note 
2, at 27–31. 
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one of Coates’s important big-picture points: that institutionalizing CBA is 
largely a challenge of management. One of the reasons OIRA was so successful 
in spurring the development of analytic capacity at the EPA and other 
executive agencies is that it collaborated with the agencies in both developing 
cost-benefit methodology and in incorporating the outputs of CBA into 
agencies’ proposed rules. When the EPA submits a proposed rule and 
accompanying analysis to OIRA for review, the result is not an adversarial 
hearing but rather a series of conference calls and meetings. Policy analysts at 
the EPA and at OIRA, as well as at other relevant agencies, informally work 
through the analytical issues together. What emerges is a substantially improved 
work product. Judicial review is ill-suited to replicating this type of 
organizational process. 
The Business Roundtable decision, however, has shaped the debate over 
CBA in financial regulation in an unfortunate way. The choice seems to be 
framed as either (1) having judges on the D.C. Circuit using some form of CBA 
legal requirement to routinely reject rules they deem lacking, or (2) simply 
hoping that despite the lack of any substantial institutional reform, agencies will 
start investing in needed analytic capacity for CBA and seriously employing it 
in their decisionmaking. For example, Coates writes that “new legal mandates 
for [CBA] . . . would be a bad idea” and that instead “[CBA] should be 
conducted only to the extent and in the manner the expert agencies choose to 
do so.”34 
But there are options for institutionalizing CBA in financial regulation other 
than legal mandates subject to judicial review, à la Business Roundtable, or 
complete agency autonomy. In particular, a CBA and regulatory-review regime 
for the independent financial regulatory agencies could be fashioned along the 
lines of OIRA review. The OIRA model has been a substantial success in other 
regulatory domains, and there is no reason why that model could not be 
similarly successful in financial regulation. 
Notably, Coates’s skepticism about the feasibility of quantification in 
financial regulation in particular is not an objection to applying to financial 
regulation CBA as it is practiced in the executive agencies under OIRA’s 
supervision. Executive Order 12,866 mandates quantification only when 
feasible,35 and agencies subject to it routinely do not quantify benefits and costs 
of rules.36 
There are of course numerous legal and institutional challenges to 
developing an OIRA-type regime for financial regulation. Perhaps most 
importantly, it is not clear how compatible OIRA review is with the various 
ways that independent agencies are, well, independent. When I was at OIRA, 
the staff at the agencies listened to me, at least some of the time. Although I 
 
 34.  Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 91. 
 35.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 190, § 6(a)(3)(C) (1994). 
 36.  See Cass Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1370–71 (explaining 
that executive agencies are frequently unable to quantify the benefits or costs of their rules). 
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would like to think that was because of the ineluctable logic of many of my 
arguments, I suspect that where I sat in the org chart was often more important. 
If the agency staff and I could not resolve an issue, it was elevated to the 
administrator of OIRA and the relevant senior political appointee at the 
promulgating agency to resolve. Failing their agreement, it went up the chain in 
the White House, and ultimately the President was indeed “the decider.” 
The chain of command in independent agencies does not run to the White 
House. Accordingly, OIRA itself might not be the right institution to play the 
role of external reviewer, at least not without more far-reaching reforms to the 
governance of the financial agencies.37 The devil is surely in these 
implementation details, but this sort of challenge seems to me to be eminently 
solvable. And I would encourage critics of judicial review of CBA, like 
Professors Coates and Cox, to consider seriously such an intraexecutive branch 
solution to institutionalizing CBA for financial regulation. 
 
 
 37.  Bartlett, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
